


THE ENHANCED READINESS BRIGADE PUZZLE:

**PROPERLY ARRANGED PIECES CAN
PROVIDE COMPENSATING LEVERAGE
TO THE FUTURE TOTAL ARMY**

A Monograph
by

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Major John Buckley

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Properly Arranged Pieces Can Provide

Compensating Leverage to the Future Total Army

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ABSTRACT

THE ENHANCED READINESS BRIGADE PUZZLE: PROPERLY ARRANGED PIECES CAN PROVIDE COMPENSATING LEVERAGE TO THE FUTURE TOTAL ARMY by Major John C. Buckley, II, USA 41 pages.

This monograph discusses the importance of the Enhanced Readiness Brigades to Total Army missions of the future. Participation on the modern battlefield in a force projection Army will be very difficult for these National Guard Brigades and their leaders considering the current structure and training deficiencies. This monograph examines these problems and proposes solutions that will enable the Enhanced Readiness Brigades to become a viable force for executing either state or federal missions.

This monograph first examines the history of the National Guard Roundout Brigades, specifically that the Army designed them for a European scenario versus the Warsaw Pact. Next, this paper discusses the National Guard training environment and its distractions. It continues with an overview of the mobilization of three Roundout Brigades in Operation Desert Storm and the reaction of the U.S. Congress and Army to the perceived failure of the Roundout concept. Then it assesses the adopted solutions to fix this problem, specifically some legislation, Bold Shift, and the Enhanced Readiness Brigade design and mission.

After considering what Total Army leaders and units will need to be successful on the unpredictable future battlefield, this paper identifies problems with senior leaders and staff training, mobilization criteria, the Army training base, and an over-reliance on the post-mobilization phase. Nonetheless, current pieces of legislation and Army training programs, if arranged properly, can solve this puzzle for future Total Army success.

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I. INTRODUCTION

National and military leaders have often debated Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. Discussion commonly concerns the organization and responsibility for management of the United States Army and Army National Guard in peacetime and war.

Congress shall have power . . . To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and to the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.¹

Today's debate over the structure and mix of future Active and Reserve forces revolves around this article. To improve combat readiness and to adapt to changing national security needs, the Army has established 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades. These National Guard combat arms brigades are to compensate for the current reduction in the Active Component combat arms structure. The purpose of this study is to determine whether the Brigade sized National Guard combat arms units will enable the Army to achieve future objectives. Considering the training challenges and problems of the past, the ambitious solutions required today, the new strategic environment, the threats and challenges, and the uncertainties of the future, are these 15 Brigades what the U.S. needs in its Total Army of tomorrow?

The Early Years:

The militia in America was very important in the 17th century when the country's needs were purely defensive. The Indians, only a limited threat to the National security, coupled with the dispersion of settlements meant that settlers had to defend themselves. As a defense against this singular threat, communities organized their own militia units. The effectiveness of these forces was questionable, but the people were afraid of standing armies. Consequently, civilian leaders discouraged the development of a professional force.²

The militia grew in political strength throughout the years because it was inexpensive to maintain, continued to meet national security demands

and was popular. Although their overall performance was only adequate, state militia's were present in every national conflict from the Revolutionary War to the Civil War. In each case, the U.S. built the national forces by combining an organized militia, individual volunteers, and troops from the small Regular Army. Evident in these instances was a military organization divided by the question of who should control the Army. To protect themselves from Regular Army control the state militias formed the National Guard Association (NGA). This organization rapidly built an even larger congressional support base. Through this alliance, the National Guard became not only a state constabulary, but also a key element in the national defense structure.³

It was not until after the Spanish-American War that precedents were set reflecting the current relationship between the Regular Army and the National Guard. Lack of readiness and poor performance in the Spanish-American War encouraged Secretary of War Elihu Root to revamp the Army. He intended to improve training and readiness in the standing Army and National Guard. His plan included a federal reserve of 100,000 men primarily as a recruiting pool. This pool could temporarily expand the Regular Army in a national emergency.⁴ The NGA, with assistance from Congressman Charles W. Dick of Ohio, defeated this plan with the Militia Act, otherwise known as the Dick Act of 1903.

The Dick Act was the first major revision of federal militia laws in 111 years.⁵ The Act directed the federal government to provide arms and equipment to the National Guard. It allowed the Regular Army to inspect the National Guard periodically, and to detail Regular Army officers to National Guard units. Finally, when federalized, National Guardsmen were to be subject to the same regulations and entitlement as the regulars.

Through several other important pieces of legislation, the National Guard secured the best of both state and federal worlds. The Militia Clause protects the National Guard against federal control while the nation is at peace. The Army Clause, added in 1933 because the government did not call the militia into World War I, insured a prominent role for the Guard

in wartime.⁶ Seven years later, the Selective Training and Service bill mandated that because the National Guard was critical to the first line of defense of this nation, its strength and organization must be maintained.⁷

The marriage between the National Guard and the Regular Army since the Dick Act has been rocky at best. The government called large numbers of reserves for World War II, for the Korean conflict and during the Berlin Crises of 1961. In each case the guard's effectiveness was only satisfactory. Nonetheless, congressional support for the guard continued to grow. However, except for a token call-up in 1968, the military did not use the National Guard during the Vietnam War.

Vietnam Era and the Total Force Concept:

President Johnson tried to wage the Vietnam War cheaply. He tried not to involve the nation and hence there was no National Guard mobilization.⁸ During the later stages of the Vietnam crises, the Army as a whole was the focal point of public criticism. Public disillusionment with the war in Vietnam grew into widespread sentiment against all war and all military institutions, especially the Army. The United States Army in 1973 was in danger of losing its institutional identity and pride of purpose. This resulted in a serious erosion of the Army's physical and moral strength. The Army, under the strong leadership of Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams, made dramatic changes to improve this condition.

General Abrams understood the strategic dimension of the National Guard. Specifically, he understood its ability to mobilize the people since the Guard was in nearly 3,000 communities throughout the United States. He recognized that the U.S. could not win a protracted war without public support. He believed that Congressmen would not mobilize National Guard units if they did not have support from their constituents. Therefore, if the Army had to rely on the National Guard to achieve its objectives, Congress would either gain public support or not commit the Army. Further, mobilizing the Guard could improve and maintain national

support.⁹

General Abrams saw the Guard as the bridge to the American people. He forged a force structure that made it impossible to go to war without a call-up of National Guard and reserves. This became known as the Total Force concept. At the end of the Vietnam War, the Army made several transitions that brought the Total Force Concept to reality. The first was a move from the draft to an all volunteer force. The second was a renewed focus on the NATO threat.

Concurrent to improving the Army, General Abrams and the Department of Defense faced the dilemma of budget constraints. In the 1970s', the same dollar amount could support seven times more troops in the Reserves. Therefore, General Abrams reduced selected active divisions from three brigades to two, moving the displaced brigades into the National Guard. He then tasked these National Guard brigades to round out regular troops in combat. In theory, the Active Army and the National Guard would deploy together.¹⁰

General Abrams used this method to expand the active Army from a twelve to a sixteen-division structure. He used the Roundout brigades and battalions to increase the total number of Army divisions without increasing the active Army manpower strength. By increasing the number of divisions, the U.S. accomplished several things. First, it increased its deterrence of potential enemies and confidence of allies. Second, it reduced the cost of maintaining a larger army. Third, the National Guard's Separate Infantry Brigades, which were in search of a mission, received one. Fourth, it helped improve readiness and visibility of the Army Reserve Component. Lastly, it garnered support from many senior Army Generals and Congressmen.¹¹

With the last achievement, above the rest, General Abrams intended to ensure that the U.S. would never again enter a conflict without the element of critical public support. This Total Force structure would encourage a political consensus or discourage military use all together.¹² Requiring a reserve call-up to bring active divisions to war strength would stimulate

public debate. If military action is necessary, by including the public in the decision would mean they are more informed and potentially more supportive of the Army's actions.

Linking the National Guard and Reserve Component units to active divisions requires the active component to pay more attention to the Roundout units. General Abrams expected this linkage to bring about expeditious modernization, better training opportunities, and create a positive general image of all Army reserve component units and personnel.¹³ He succeeded in the latter goal. By the 1990s', the Reserve Component's primary mission was to increase the strength of Active Divisions for major, protracted combat in Europe.

The first Roundout brigade became the third combat brigade for the 25th Infantry Division in 1973. By 1988, six out of eighteen divisions had a Roundout brigade. The Army, satisfied and confident with this program, designed all reinforcing forces for NATO, except its early deploying light forces, with a Roundout brigade or battalion.

The emphasis on maintaining light divisions at full strength demonstrates the Army's assumption that rapid response contingency operations would require only light forces. Roundout brigades were predominantly in combat divisions with a reinforcing mission to NATO rather than forward deployed or contingency forces. Organizing this way meant that strategic planners assumed there would be ample strategic warning upon war with the Soviet Union.¹⁴

Today:

By Operation Desert Shield in 1990, Roundout became a crucial indicator of the status and health of the relationship between the active Army and the Army reserve components. It represented the closest possible integration of the central kind of Army unit, the division combat units. By then, Army divisions with Roundout Brigades had grown to seven out of twelve in CONUS.

The defense community has made considerable effort to learn from the

Gulf War, the largest mobilization since World War II. Due to the perceived failure of the Roundout Brigades in Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and the current force reduction, the future role of National Guard combat units is receiving a good deal of attention within the Department of Defense and Congress. To provide compensating leverage to the Active Component for future contingencies, the National Guard is developing 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades. The intent is for these combat units to operate with Active Divisions or Corps in a range of scenarios. These include rapid mobilization and deployment to overseas combat zones. In April 1994, the National Guard Bureau identified these 15 Brigades. In October, the Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan approved the structure and mission assignment for these units. Presently, the U.S. will employ these Brigades when the accomplishment of the national mission is beyond the capacity of the Active Component.

A foundation of the Total Force Policy, namely, the preeminence of the NATO threat, has gone away with the end of the Cold War. This fact, together with competition for budget resources from domestic needs, compels civilian leaders to reduce the military force structure and its worldwide presence. Consequently, the Army is changing from a forward-deployed force prepared and organized to fight the Warsaw Pact to a CONUS-based force preparing for a range of contingencies. The Army must now reconsider virtually every aspect of its structure, training, and manning. The evolving U.S. security strategy requires a Total Force able to respond swiftly to a wide range of contingencies that appear with little or no warning. To do this, the force will need to maintain a high degree of combat readiness to meet unexpected risks. The structuring of the Total Army with respect to its current role in our security strategy is vital to the future of our country.

II. TRAINING CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Readiness is defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the ability of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipments to deliver the outputs for

which the military designed them (including the ability to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays).¹⁵ According to Jomini, a permanent army should always be upon a respectable footing, and it should be capable of being doubled by a reserve which is always prepared.¹⁶ This is what General Abrams' desired with his Total Force design. Even though active and National Guard leaders embraced the Total Force and Roundout concepts, they failed to maintain proper readiness in the Roundout Brigades.

Because of many training deficiencies and distractions, the Roundout Brigade's were not ready when called in 1990. Much of the research conducted after ODS revealed that the Roundout Brigades were insufficiently trained. They were weak in individual and collective training and in staff training. Improperly trained and schooled officers and leaders compounded the problem. Although Army leaders in the 1970's determined that the Roundout Brigades were less expensive to maintain, they felt that Roundout Brigades were capable of overcoming readiness deficiencies during mobilization.

Battle Focused Training:

The foreword of FM 25-101, the Army's Battle Focused Training manual, says that training is the Army's top priority. It also declares that training is the cornerstone of readiness which develops warfighting proficiency in soldiers and leaders. Training is a means to exercise collective capabilities that units will require in combat. Finally, training prepares soldiers, leaders, and units to fight and win in war.¹⁷

Battle focused training is a concept that determines training requirements from wartime missions. It guides the planning, execution, and assessment of each training program to ensure that its members train as they are going to fight.¹⁸ The Commander is the integrator who melds individual, leader and unit training requirements into collective training events using multi-echelon techniques. Individual training must develop soldiers who are proficient in battlefield skills, disciplined, physically tough, and highly motivated. Unit training must prepare our forces for the

rigors of the battlefield. Leader training is an imperative for every echelon; it is an investment in the Army of today and tomorrow.

Brigade Battle Focus:

A combat maneuver brigade is the most complex unit to train because the complete synchronization of all seven Battlefield operating systems begins at that level.¹⁹ Mastery of synchronization is essential to successful application of combat power. Tasks and standards associated with these skills change at all levels as battlefield conditions change. Execution at this level is both an art and a complex science which takes considerable time and effort to master.

A brigade's battle focus is to fight combined arms battles and engagements. It must employ every modern tactical means available. Brigade commanders and staffs are responsible for integrating and coordinating different kinds of maneuver battalions, field artillery, aviation, engineer, air defense artillery, air force fire, and sometimes naval fire support to accomplish brigade and division missions. Thus, organic and supporting combat, combat support and combat service support units all combine to make a contribution to brigade operations.²⁰

The Army Research Institute (ARI) identified several training requirements which increase the chances for successful brigade performances on today's lethal and high tempo battlefield. The initial focus must be on individual and small unit skills. To ensure satisfactory performance at this level, leaders must first properly assess the skill level of squads and platoons. This helps properly align battle focused training. Leaders must then reduce training distraction and maximize personnel stability, primarily of key leaders and staff members. Finally, leaders must plan repetitive training to account for skill decay and ensure sustainment.²¹

ARI emphasizes that training must include classroom and field instruction, emphasizing combined arms training, ultimately integrating the battle staff. This training must include maneuver training to simulate expected conditions on the battlefield and to improve maneuver execution

and synchronization. As the training occurs, it is essential that staffs at all levels capture the lessons and develop standard operating procedures. Most importantly, senior commanders must train, mentor, lead, and supervise subordinates while guiding and directing the execution of battle focused training missions.

Leadership Deficiencies:

Framers of the Roundout concept assumed that the large number of senior grade personnel and the lower number of personnel turnover indicated stability and favored readiness.²² However, this is a faulty assumption. Training distractions and poor training techniques produced soldiers and officers lacking the basic leadership skills necessary to lead soldiers and unit and to execute battlefield operations.²³

The primary reason for this deficiency is that the training was not battle focused. Officers and noncommissioned officers failed to organize, plan and execute effective training. Noncommissioned officers lacked leadership skills and job knowledge to train soldiers. From physical fitness to individual weapons qualification, individual training did not prepare soldiers and officers in their basic wartime skills. This lack of preparation permeated throughout entire organizations, effecting senior leaders and higher level staff performances. Leaders lacked initiative, basic soldiering skills, and tactical and technical competence. Officers did not understand doctrine and systems capabilities and could not make rapid decisions under stress of simulated combat.²⁴ All of this effected the ability of the brigade leaders and staffs to synchronize combat power.

A common finding in every post-ODS study, Congressional or Army directed, is that training of National Guard senior officers was ineffective. They all noted that senior commanders in the National Guard are reluctant to criticize or correct subordinate commanders or provide adequate guidance to the same and their staff. They are not necessarily incompetent, they are just uncomfortable with AirLand Battle doctrine and tactics themselves.²⁵ Therefore, during pre and post-mobilization training,

they refrain from doing what is required at the tactical level; namely, mentoring.

Staff Deficiencies:

Staff operations are an identified Army wide weakness. It is a weakness further exacerbated by the lack of guidance and direction provided by senior leaders and the limited training conditions in the National Guard. The limited operational experience available makes most staff officers book smart, but not professionals.²⁶

Deficiencies in individual skills and lack of proficiency in the staff process hamper collective efforts. Staffs may be familiar with the process, but they have no appreciation for how each step affects another or the execution.²⁷ Because maneuver exercises occur primarily at Annual Training (AT), and large scale maneuvers during the post-mobilization phase, staff members do not have the opportunity to practice the necessary staff skills. The one or two years spent on a National Guard staff executing wartime responsibilities equates to fifteen to thirty days.

National Guard Training Environment:

A Roundout brigade has thirty nine days a year to conduct training to master these functions. This is broken into twenty-four days of inactive duty training (IDT) and 15 days of AT. In this limited time, a Roundout brigade has to accomplish all individual, crew, and collective training required by its wartime mission and to maintain the basic skills. It must also integrate new arrivals, conduct all necessary administrative requirements, and execute many events that divert their attention from training.

This limited amount of training time competes with many training distractions. These distractions include lack of training time, leaders of all ranks not being properly trained before assuming jobs, limited training aids, and poor training areas and ranges that are distant from armories.²⁸ Stationing and dispersing brigade size units throughout a state or several

states further impedes training opportunities at the distant training areas and ranges. Finally, a significant distraction to Battle Focused training that is not easily overcome is the interference of state responsibilities. At a minimum, one weekend is reserved for riot training. Also, ongoing missions such as drug eradication and interdiction, community projects including domestic policing and riot control, and disaster relief reduce training time for conventional combat.

Considering all these diversions, a more truthful calculation of actual days available for training in a year might be twenty to twenty-five days.²⁹ Therefore, it is difficult to plan combined arms training except at AT. No time is available for sustainment training. Additionally, units commonly defer collective training until mobilized. This is not sufficient training for leaders to perform on the sophisticated battlefield environment of today.

The three pillars of military leader training include institutional training, experiences gained in operational assignments and self-development. The reserve component officer gets far less training and development than his active peers. All three pillars conflict with a full time job and family. It is considerably more difficult to train and survive as an officer in the National Guard because many civilian life distractions are prevalent. A National Guard Officer must function at a job in a civilian community and yet be ready to be called to arms at a moment's notice. Sometimes, an officer has to travel long distances to work in a position requiring his specialty.³⁰ Often he has to change his branch or specialty for assignment closer to home or for promotion.

Whereas active leaders acquire and sustain proficiency in one and two-year operational assignments, this is equal to 78 days in the National Guard. Reluctantly, National Guard leaders soon come to realize that the minimum service time is inadequate to carry out their leadership responsibilities.³¹ This leadership inadequacy was visible during the 1990 mobilization. With only thirty-nine days of training allocated, it is not feasible to expect a National Guard Brigade to succeed on the modern

battlefield. These tasks are too many and too complex.³²

The commander's specific emphasis is on training one level down and evaluating two levels down. All of this is very difficult to do in a constrained environment such as that provided in the National Guard. It is essential that senior leaders create the right environment for training junior leaders and staff officers. Effective training requires the personal time, energy, and guidance of all leaders. Commanders must personally observe and assess training at all echelons. They must also be proficient at the skills their subordinates must use. If they are not, how can they direct or correct subordinates? Most important, how can they mentor them? As the first call-up of U.S. reserve forces in 20 years and the first mobilization of Roundout units, ODS provides clues about how the Total Army should organize, plan and train for the future.

III. DESERT STORM MOBILIZATION TO BOLD SHIFT

In 1987, the Office of the Secretary of Defense scheduled a mobilization exercise called Nifty Nuggett. The purpose of the exercise was to ascertain whether or not the U.S. could mobilize large forces to counter an incursion into Europe. Nifty Nugget confirmed the fear that National Guard units could not achieve combat readiness if there was little or no time available for post-mobilization manning, equipping and training. The primary lesson learned in Nifty Nugget was that possibilities existed where the United States might need to deploy National Guard combat units "ready or not."³³ Furthermore, the last four National Guard deployments (World War II, Korea, Berlin, and Vietnam) all had mobilization problems.³⁴

The mobilization plan before ODS fell into two categories. The first category included small contingencies like Operation Just Cause, requiring elements of a single Corps. Due to the expected quick deployment criteria and short duration employment, the Army would rely upon individual reserve volunteers. The second category was for large contingencies requiring greater than two Corps. This category assumed a longer warning and mobilization period, with a limited call-up as preparatory before partial

mobilization.³⁵ This type of contingency would require the call-up of the Roundout brigades.

Desert Storm Mobilization Problems:

Operation Desert Storm fell into the second category, but the actual mobilization was far different than expected. None of the Roundout brigades for the 24th Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, nor the 1st Infantry Division deployed with their active counterparts. Instead, all active brigades rounded out these divisions: the 197th Separate Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Armored Division's Tiger Brigade, and the 2nd Armored Division (Forward) respectively.

The Army mobilized the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Georgia Army National Guard and the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from Louisiana on 30 November 1990. The Army mobilized a third brigade, the 155th Armored Brigade of the Mississippi Guard, on 7 December 1990. After extensive post-mobilization training, the Army validated only the 48th Brigade as ready for deployment. Recent research about this issue directed by Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense identified systemic problems with the Army National Guard Roundout brigades. Among the most common problems were the lack of individual skills and proficiency throughout the chain of command, the lack of leader and staff development training, poor training techniques, and inadequate equipment and manning levels. Not surprisingly, these deficiencies are very similar to those identified in Nifty Nuggett and the last four National Guard deployments.

In response to this perceived failure of the Roundout concept, Congress passed several pieces of legislation to correct National Guard readiness levels. Subsequently, and as a reaction to the legislation, both the Active and Reserve Components initiated joint training efforts to improve the National Guard's readiness. Senior leaders of the Army, National Guard, and Reserves have also agreed upon major restructuring in the Reserve Component. This is significant because all three Army components support these changes; such agreement is an unprecedented

occurrence in the history of the U.S.³⁶

Congressional Reaction:

The first piece of legislation intended to improve National Guard readiness is the Army National Guard Readiness Reform Act of 1992. This requires that by September 1997 50 percent of enlisted and 65 percent of officer strength have at least two years of prior active duty experience.³⁷ It directs that Army leaders make specific improvements in AC/RC integration, in modern equipment and in full time support to the National Guard. It also directs an increased emphasis on leadership competence and a renewed concentration on individual and collective training down through company level.

A second piece of legislation, Title XI of the 1993 Defense Authorization Act, sets out specific obligations for active Army units. The Active Army must review Guard unit training plans, officer promotions, readiness requirements, resource requirements and must validate compatibility. Title XI placed into law some more salient mechanisms needed to fix the systematic shortfalls identified during mobilization for Desert Storm. It specifically emphasizes the readiness of maneuver units. The goal of Title XI is to attain and maintain a meaningful combat role for the Army National Guard.³⁸

In an attempt to improve the response of certain National Guard units, the Secretary of Defense pushed a third piece of legislation. He tried to gain for himself the call-up authority of Reserve troops. Under Federal Law, the President can order activation of 200,000 guard and reserve soldiers for ninety days with a ninety-day extension option. Anything longer requires Congressional approval. Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee simply did not believe anybody but the President and Congress should have the authority to order Reserve troops for Active duty. They did not like the idea of the Secretary of Defense, a non-elected official, having this right.³⁹ Therefore, they refused to give to the Secretary of Defense call-up authority. They did, however, increase

the length of call-ups from ninety to 180 days. It also includes an automatic 180-day extension.

A proposed piece of legislation that will effect National Guard Officer management is the Reserve Officer Professional Management Act (ROPMA) included in the 1995 Defense Authorization Bill. The intent of this Act is to improve the quality of Reserve officers. It seeks to create a better climate for competition by ensuring that the "best qualified," not merely "qualified" officers, will be promoted and selected for commands.

Finally, the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance and the Bottom-Up Review call for 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades.⁴⁰ These Brigades will help the U.S. remain a world power by providing compensating leverage to the Active Army.⁴⁰ The Department of Defense expects them to be deployable to overseas combat zones within ninety days after call-up. They will be staffed at a higher level, train closely with Active Component soldiers, and have resource priorities. Key to the design of these Brigades is mission flexibility combined with compatibility to Active Component Divisions or Corps. They will provide units that are more trainable with an improved readiness posture. Therefore, they can meet the guidance in the Bottom-Up Review and in the Defense Planning Guidance.⁴¹

Army Reaction:

In direct response to the Congressional actions, Forces Command (FORSCOM) initiated a program called Bold Shift. This is a program designed to improve National Guard and Reserve readiness by establishing a close training relationship between Guard units and their assigned Active Army counterparts. Again, the purpose of this program is to make the Total Army one. And, if the early indications are right, the path is leading to one-on-one participation, which has never been practiced before. National Guard leaders believe that they now have a plan and a product that provide sufficient training and retraining.⁴² Notably, Bold Shift is a product that the Active Component and Reserve Component units worked out together.

Bold Shift is a vector for fixing the problems identified in the 1990

mobilization of three Roundout Brigades. The State Adjutant General (TAG) is responsible for planning, resourcing, and executing training to standards along with subordinate commanders. Training will focus primarily at the platoon level. This is not a ceiling, but a minimum level a maneuver unit must master before mobilization.⁴³ Platoons will gain crew-level proficiency in lanes training using drills and tank tactical tables before advancing to a Platoon Situational Training Exercise (STX). Once they master requisite skills, they will move on to field exercises.

Leadership development is a key portion of the Bold Shift effort. Bold Shift provides more structure to the officer and non-commissioned officer development program than in the past. It provides a career map for officers and leaders similar to the one used by the Active Component. It directs officers when to attend schools and then uses this as a qualifier for job assignments. The Army understands that leaders cannot supervise unit training if they themselves have no experience. Bold Shift will encourage leaders to train with their own units.

Collective training at a level higher than platoon will not occur until Post-mobilization periods. Battalion and higher staffs will use simulations in the pre-mobilization period to enhance their command and control capabilities. The overarching strategy is to establish a strong foundation in small units and staffs before moving on to the more complex tasks that large units and staffs necessitate. This strategy will result in parallel, simultaneously executed training programs at each echelon.⁴⁴

An intent of Bold Shift is to anticipate the post-mobilization training requirements of the Enhanced Readiness Brigades. This will simplify the transition from a peacetime training level to a minimum acceptable wartime level of capability based on the Commander In Chiefs (CINC) guidelines. More importantly, the post-mobilization requirements will be determined by the pre-mobilization training status.

Regional Training Detachments:

The most significant contribution of Title XI and Bold Shift training toward enhancing the Readiness Brigades is the development of Regional Training Detachments (RTD). The RTD consists of Active soldiers who on a daily basis assist in the National Guard's preparation of training. They play a paramount role in the evaluation of training. They are an integral part of the whole Bold Shift program. The National Guard has had a tremendous amount of success in training since last year due to the involvement of the RTD's.⁴⁵

Stationing Active RTD soldiers with the National Guard units gives them better insight as to the strengths and weaknesses of the unit.⁴⁶ These active duty soldiers help to plan, coordinate, execute, and evaluate the training of the Roundout Brigade soldiers. They are to coordinate multiple functions between the division and brigade with their main focus on training. The training assistance includes: officer and NCO development; better staff training; squad, platoon, and company lanes training; maintenance and logistics training; and gunnery training.

Goals for the Future:

During a series of "Off-site Meetings" in 1993 and 1994, Army leaders expressed their satisfaction with the efforts of Congress and the Total Army. The intent of these monthly "Off-site Meetings" is to continue improving the wartime readiness of the National Guard. These monthly "Off-site Meetings" included discussion between senior leaders on issues of the highest significance; such as budget, roles and missions, force structure, and end-strength.⁴⁷ From these meetings came two goals for future National security. The first is that the Active Army, the Guard and Reserve must forge a closer partnership. The second is that the U.S. must create and maintain forces, organizations, programs and policies that reflect the realities of the post-Cold War era.⁴⁸ Essentially, this structure must satisfy the requirements of a power projection strategy. They agree that the Army National Guard's primary missions are to prepare for wartime combat and to remain ready to provide assistance in peacetime domestic

emergencies. They are sure that the combined effect of all these remedies noted above will better prepare the Total Force for any future conflict.

The driving force behind the actions of Congressional and military leaders is an appreciation for the significance of a trained and effective Army that maintains the fighting edge. Leaders mean to improve the foundation of the Total Army with their efforts. Training associations between active units and Enhanced Readiness Brigades provide the future Total Army an effective and economical means of enhancing Guard and Reserve training and readiness. These leaders must, however, continue to prepare the National Guard to respond quickly to regional crises. Also, these units must be able to fight upon arrival in the Theater of Operations. It is critical to the U.S. National Military Strategy that the Army National Guard, particularly the Enhanced Readiness Brigades, overcome the problems that arose in the ODS mobilization.

IV. BOLD SHIFT TRAINING ANALYSIS

Past mobilizations, including Operation Desert Storm, have shown that the Army did not sufficiently train National Guard Combat Brigades before mobilization. The Bold Shift initiatives have overhauled the National Guard peacetime training strategies in an attempt to prevent this type of failure in the future. The primary goal for the National Guard's new training strategy is to train to mobilize, deploy, and fight upon arrival. The overarching training objective is unit readiness. Specifically, the combat arms training focus is to train to platoon and crew gunnery proficiency during pre-mobilization while simultaneously conducting battalion and brigade staff drills.⁴⁹

Bold Shift and its enriched training programs have improved the National Guard combat arms peacetime training performance.⁵⁰ Achieving and maintaining standards in wartime tasks during peacetime is paramount because early deploying units may not have lengthy post-mobilization periods.⁵¹ Due to the building block approach of the STX called Lanes training, proficiency of wartime skills at the company level and below is

much better than in the 1990 and 1991 mobilization of the three Roundout Brigades.⁵² Recent Combat Training Center (CTC) results from 1991 through 1994, however, suggest that at the brigade and battalion staff levels, as well as senior leader levels, performance has not improved.

The leader training assessment in this chapter is taken from a comparison between the 1990 mobilization of the three Roundout Brigades for ODS and the training results of National Guard Brigade and Battalion units after the adoption of Bold shift. The mobilization data comes from post-mobilization After Action Reports (AAR), Tactical Commander's Development Course (TCDC) AARs and two National Training Center (NTC) Final Exercise Reports (FER) for two of the mobilized brigades. Early in the post-mobilization process, all three Roundout Brigade staffs and their subordinate battalion staffs went to Fort Leavenworth and participated in TCDC. One Roundout Brigade went to the NTC for its post-mobilization phase, and a second went to the NTC during the summer of 1991 prior to the Bold shift initiatives.

Post Bold Shift training results include six National Guard unit rotations to the NTC and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from 1992 through 1994, and three National Guard Warfighters in 1994. The only comments evaluated in these AARs and FERs pertain to performance assessments of the brigade and battalion commanders and their staff's.

Small Unit Training Assessment:

The strength of Bold Shift is its focus on the units that form the foundation in all combat operations; namely the squad and platoon. Lanes training is the vehicle the Army uses to train these units. Lanes training is designed and controlled by Active Army soldiers in the RTDs. In preparation for this type of training, active duty soldiers assist platoon and company leadership in assessing squad and platoon proficiency. From this assessment, they identify battle tasks that require training.

During execution of Lanes training, the RTD soldiers work directly with the squad and platoon leaders. They alert the leaders to their

essential responsibilities with respect to a particular battle task. Subsequently, the leader trains his or her own unit. In this manner, the small unit leaders receive training and the unit gains confidence in the leader. The baseline for success in Lanes training is the validation of the squad and platoon leaders.

This form of training has been successful in improving small unit readiness and enhancing leader competence and confidence.⁵³ In a short time, many small units have made a spectacular advance toward overcoming the deficiencies noted in the 1990 mobilizations. General Sullivan, the Chief of the Staff of the Army, advocates the primacy of small-unit skills over that of large Brigade size maneuver training. He believes that this will allow the Army to reduce in size while maintaining the capacity to fight sudden, fast-paced regional conflicts.⁵⁴ Additionally, he believes that making small units combat ready simplifies the process of training to battalion and brigade level in the post-mobilization phase.⁵⁵

Leader Training Assessment:

The methods currently used for training senior leaders in combat units and their staffs have not been as successful as Lanes training. These key personnel display weaknesses comparable to the past. There are a number of similarities in the post-mobilization assessments for the three Roundout Brigades mobilized in 1990 and in the recent CTC final exercise reports. Specifically, Observer Controller (OC) comments are nearly identical.

All three Roundout Brigades staffs and their subordinate battalion staffs participated in a revised TCDC. The purpose was to enhance staff skills and processes. Additionally, one Roundout Brigade conducted post-mobilization training at the NTC, and a second Roundout Brigade completed a rotation within one year after their post-mobilization training. The AARs and FERs from these training events reveal only three common strengths. Evaluators praised the staffs for being receptive to instruction and training and for having a good work ethic. Secondly, staffs had mutual

respect and cohesion allowing for positive interaction. Finally, all individual skills improved, which affected the total staff integration. Other strengths noted by the evaluators were small and not oriented to mission success.

Common weaknesses identified by the TCDC staff and the NTC OCs in 1990 and 1991 were more profound. Deficiencies in individual skills and basic knowledge of enemy and friendly capabilities and limitations hampered the collective efforts of the staff. These deficiencies were compounded because commanders, inexperienced in staff responsibilities and the planning process, did not provide sufficient guidance and direction. Many staff efforts produced combat plans that were faulty in principle and marred by poor execution. Inadequate or negligible commander's direction complicated the staff deficiencies. Current assessments of Brigade staff performances during the evaluated CTC rotations are very similar. The comparison seems to indicate that there has not been an improvement in brigade and battalion staff performance.

The common strengths identified during the NTC, JRTC and BCTP rotations in 1992 through 1994 mirror the previous assessments. One improvement mentioned by many OCs is that staffs arrived for training with some progression in the basic individual and collective skills. They all maintained cohesiveness and a strong desire to learn. According to the same OCs, however, these staffs were far from being prepared to plan and direct combat actions.

The weaknesses identified in these same CTC rotations are identical with those made in the 1990 and 1991 mobilization activities. The commanders and their staffs lack the basic knowledge of both enemy and friendly capabilities and limitations. This degrades their ability to synchronize or mass their combat power effectively. Finally, brigade commanders and staffs lost the initiative quickly during the execution of their plan and began reacting to the enemy. Poor cross talk between commanders magnified this deficiency. Again, the OCs indicate that the result was inferior plans executed improperly.

Training Shortfalls:

This training analysis suggests that the strength of the National Guard is at the small unit level. Bold Shift training is improving the combat readiness at company level and below.⁵⁶ Brigade and Battalion staff training, however, is not improving the ability of commanders or their staffs to synchronize combat power effectively and efficiently.

Generating combat power is currently the principle mission of Brigade and Battalion staffs. It requires confident, competent leaders who provide the direction, purpose, and motivation required to inspire soldiers. Commanders generate combat power by integrating maneuver, firepower, and protection.⁵⁷ Without the knowledge of enemy and friendly limitations and capabilities and without the experience in synchronizing combat power, senior leaders cannot properly mass the combat power of their units.

If the Enhanced Readiness Brigades are to provide compensating leverage to the Active Component, the Army has to improve National Guard staff and leader training. Brigades are complex entities that contain many subordinate echelons, including maneuver elements. Brigade staffs require complex training in such tasks as coordinating fire, movement, synchronization of activities, and integration with other functions such as artillery, maintenance, engineer, and other support.⁵⁸

To meet the requirements of immediate reinforcement in the future, National Guard combat units, specifically the Enhanced Readiness Brigades, need to be cohesive units trained in the fundamentals of individual and small unit tactics. Senior leaders in these organizations have to be competent in tactical skill, and in command and control staff skills so as to generate the potential combat power of these units. Although the Army has learned lessons in maintaining small unit readiness, it apparently has not made any headway in improving the leaders or staffs that will command and control these small units. The rest of this study will answer the question whether the Enhanced Readiness Brigades will enable the Army to achieve its objective of providing a very responsive total force.

V. INTO THE FUTURE

Many things have changed since General Abrams first conceived his Total Force policy, most drastically the sources and nature of the global threat. Today, similar to General Abram's era, the U.S. is simultaneously refocusing its efforts while facing budget reductions. Currently, the Army is trying to maintain capabilities at a high level of readiness while reducing structure and strength. It has become increasingly clear that the active Army will rely on the National Guard and Reserves to meet National Security needs and calls for domestic assistance. The key to this combination is to use the strength of each component efficiently and productively to achieve maximum synergistic effect. It is imperative that the leaders of today look not at what is best in the future for a singular component, but rather at what is best for the Total Army.

General Abrams' current successor, General Gordon R. Sullivan, has a vision that the future Total Army will train and be ready to serve the nation at home and abroad, while remaining capable of achieving a decisive strategic victory. In the future, the Army will orient toward different and uncertain contingencies. These contingencies may unfold quickly. National leaders will expect timely strategic decision-making on mobilization and a quick response by committed forces. General Sullivan encourages military and civilian leadership to be innovative and flexible in their mutual efforts in designing the future Total Army to meet these possibilities. He often stimulates these leaders to break the links with history if the paradigm in question is no longer appropriate.⁵⁹

New National Security Strategy:

The U.S. has not been immune to the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in the Defense establishment. Now that the U.S. is no longer confronted with the formidable Soviet Union it is reducing its forces and its worldwide presence. The Army is changing from a forward-deployed force prepared and organized to fight the Warsaw pact to a Conus-based force preparing for a range of contingencies. This reorientation is

causing the Army to reconsider virtually every aspect of its structure, training and manning.⁶⁰

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact threat also has caused a shift in the United States' national security needs. The primary objectives that President Clinton has stressed in his National Security Strategy are for the U.S. military, in concert with its allies, to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts; to pursue arms control, particularly with weapons of mass destruction; to stimulate economic growth and free trade globally; and to promote democracy.⁶¹

To protect and advance these interests, the U.S. must deploy robust and flexible military forces that can accomplish a variety of tasks. According to the President, these tasks will require the military to deter and defeat aggression through power projection and through providing a credible overseas presence, to improve sustainment capabilities, and to conduct operations other than war (OOTW). To do this, military forces must be ready to respond quickly and to operate effectively.

To execute the power projection called for in the National Security Strategy requires the military to mobilize and operate anywhere in the world under short notice conditions. The key for the nation is to apply all or some elements of national power to act in a crisis, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. This demands a well trained, well-educated force, led by technically and tactically proficient officers. This force must achieve a level of competence necessary to successfully accomplish the requirements of post-mobilization training and of achieving victory on the future battlefield.

Future Warfare:

Weaponry has already increased lethality to such a degree that it has compelled a major reduction in density of forces on the battlefield. It has also greatly increased the tempo of operations. With a reduced density of forces operating at a higher tempo, soldiers must control and influence greater areas and must operate at unprecedented speed.⁶² Consequently,

future armies will require good leaders able to integrate units with complex systems rapidly.

The future battlefield will be densely packed with high quality systems whose range and lethality will make combat intense, quick and deadly.⁶³ This will put strains on the command and control of engaged forces. Such an environment will place a premium on leadership and unit cohesion. Leaders operating on this battlefield must maximize the effects of their own capabilities and must sufficiently degrade those of the enemies so as to achieve superior relative combat power. Correct application of superior combat power has its roots in proper preparation. Training leaders to this standard is demanding and requires a great deal of time and resources. The limited resources available today will cause a problem with achieving this in the future; and therefore reliance on reserves is becoming fiscally more inviting.

Future Dependence on Reserve Component:

The Guard and Reserve forces will undoubtedly provide an important element in this strategy. They are going to provide the compensating leverage that we need to make this strategy work. The Reserve component is to reduce the risk associated with a smaller active force by generating savings that the Army can reinvest into readiness.⁶⁴ This means that the Enhanced Readiness Brigades must be prepared to meet broad responsibilities in a full range of conflicts including OOTW. They must be able to pick up missions that will effectively augment our AC with less operational expense.⁶⁵

The drawdown of the Active Component and eruption of regional conflicts has made reservists more important than ever. Since the active military cannot afford to maintain excess anymore and since contingency combat demands an extraordinary degree of battle readiness, technically astute and tactically aware active and reserve soldiers and units must be ready to go now. To maintain such standards will require total professional commitment.⁶⁶ Considering the training analysis and the

current budget and time constraints effecting training, it is easy to see why many leaders believe that the National Guard is not a viable option for the expected modern contingencies. These dissenters argue that there will not be many forward deployed units to "hold" an aggressor, nor sufficient warning time to prepare any Enhanced Readiness Brigades for the conflict.

In the General Headquarters Exercise 1994, the Army simulated strategic response to two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRC). Two major problems arose in the application of the compensating leverage the Enhanced Readiness Brigades are supposed to provide. First, the conditions during the first conflict did not warrant the call-up of any National Guard combat units. Secondly, no authority exists to call-up National Guard units preparatory to a second regional crisis; consequently, they were not ready for the second major regional conflict. Therefore, when the second conflict did occur, the Enhanced Readiness Brigades could not mobilize, train and deploy fast enough to assist the Active Component squelch this problem. It was easier, and more efficient to shift active forces from the first MRC to the second. Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, says that these two issues put pressure on the politicians and Army leaders to heed General Sullivan's advice and break with the past.⁶⁷

Future Objectives:

The post Cold War period has not been as peaceful as the new world order predicted. There has been significant turmoil, uncertainty and potential for violence. American armed involvement in contingency areas where there are no forward deployed forces is more likely in tomorrow's less predictable security environment. Also, such involvements place more sophisticated demands upon our forces.⁶⁸ First, future contingencies may appear with no or limited warning. Second, many developing nations are building large arsenals that make our intervention riskier and tougher.⁶⁹ It will be imperative that we wage quick, decisive campaigns. It is therefore prudent for the future total force to maintain a high degree of readiness to operate effectively within this rapidly changing environment.

As the U.S. reshapes its military, it must address the challenges of the future in an intelligent, prudent and responsible manner. There must continue to be a clear commitment to change with a recognition that the main purpose of rearranging functions is to protect America.⁷⁰ The solution must provide new approaches on how to do business. To execute its part in the National Military Strategy, the Total Army will depend more heavily on the Reserve Component and National Guard than ever before.⁷¹ The Enhanced Readiness Brigades must assume the strategic functions that a smaller active force can no longer cover. This is the objective for the Enhanced Readiness Brigades. The question not yet answered is how can these Enhanced Readiness Brigades overcome their training distractions and training deficiencies to attain this objective?

VI. PUTTING THE PUZZLE TOGETHER

General Sullivan's advice is correct, but it is falling on deaf ears within the Total Force. The Army has to break the paradigm; it is not merely creating a downsized version of the Cold War Army. Recent legislation and Army programs are major steps toward improving the old system; however, as an attempt to provide true compensating leverage to the Total Army, these steps are insufficient. Currently, all of the necessary pieces to this puzzle exist. The National Guard combat arms units are essential for National Security, and they exist in the Enhanced Readiness Brigades. The brigade is the appropriate size structure to retain in the National Guard because it is the Army's basic fighting element.⁷² Commanders can tailor a brigade to operate in any environment across the spectrum of conflict and this flexibility is necessary to survive on the unpredictable future battlefield. Additionally, legislation and training programs currently exist that will help overcome training distractions and deficiencies previously noted. If national and military leaders properly arrange these pieces, the Enhanced Readiness Brigades can provide sufficient combat power in support of a military response to a global threat or to multiple contingencies.

Current statistics suggest that the Enhanced Readiness Brigades can deploy and fight immediately, but with enormously high risk and at the cost of many casualties.⁷³ On the other hand, the nation cannot afford to have a large portion of its military sit out a war. There are still some problems with senior leader and staff training, mobilization criteria, and the capacity of the Army training base. In order for the Enhanced Readiness Brigades to overcome these deficiencies, military planners have placed great emphasis on the post-mobilization phase. Currently, military planners expect this critically important phase to resolve these peacetime shortcomings and miraculously produce a combat ready outfit in 90 days. Nonetheless, Bold Shift, along with current legislation including the Dick Act, Title XI, and the Army National Guard Readiness Reform Act can easily solve these problems.

United States' military forces may be committed on short notice anywhere in the world to confront and overcome a variety of difficult challenges. Hence, training to high standards is essential in peace and war. Everyone must train and be ready to deploy. In peacetime, Bold Shift is preparing the Enhanced Readiness Brigades to operate under such conditions. This program focuses on small units and small unit leaders. Simultaneously, senior leaders and staffs conduct numerous staff drills relying heavily on simulations. National Guard and Active leaders coordinate this small unit and leader training, but the active soldiers in the RTDs organize, control, evaluate, and supervise the training events. By making the AC support RC training during peacetime periods and during mobilization to bring reserve Brigades to wartime proficiency, the U.S. is diverting critical assets from solving the conflict.

Senior Leader and Staff Training:

Senior leader training continues to be the greatest weakness in the National Guard. National Guard Officers are not well versed in individual combat skills and unit leadership techniques. Also, they are unfamiliar with instructional methods such as the use of training aids and classroom

presentation techniques.⁷⁴ Furthermore, separating leaders from their units during Annual Training (AT) and post-mobilization for their own individual training exacerbates this weakness. This means that leaders are absent from unit training and hence do not fulfill their leadership responsibilities. Ultimately, this means that leaders will not be training their units the way that they should be at these critical times. They will be training themselves and their staffs while the active RTD soldiers are training the unit. Finally, since RTD soldiers organize and supervise all the training in peace and post-mobilization, there will be few National Guardsmen experienced enough to conduct training once the unit arrives in the theater of war.

The primary method of training for the Enhanced Readiness Brigade leaders and staff is through simulations. Bold Shift uses simulation training to make sure leaders master core, war winning tasks in peacetime. Simulations and Game playing are not effective unless balanced with old-fashioned learning of basic concepts that underlie the immediate task.⁷⁵ The fact that National Guard Officers do not possess a strong foundation in basic combat tasks reduces the effectiveness of this type of training.

As General Burba stated in his testimony to Congress in 1992, combat skills, including maneuver and complex synchronization skills, are too difficult to train during weekend drills at Battalion level and higher. You cannot develop battalion and brigade leaders, nor can you develop staffs, First Sergeants, and Command Sergeants Major in ninety days of post-mobilization training.⁷⁶ It takes a career of experiences to develop these key leaders. If senior leader development in the Enhanced Readiness Brigades does not improve rapidly, the Active Component will again try to increase mobilization response times. They could again mobilize small units or individuals in a national crisis.⁷⁷

Mobilization Criteria:

The General Headquarters Exercise 1994 identified two additional problems. The first issue revolves around the authority of the President

to mobilize the Enhanced Readiness Brigades after one crisis occurs preparatory to a second crisis. Governors and businesses will not favor National Guardsmen missing up to a year of work while waiting for a second crisis to occur. Therefore the Department of Defense has determined that they will not mobilize the Enhanced Readiness Brigades until after a conflict has gone beyond the capabilities of the Active Component.⁷⁸ The President can mobilize National Guard units for 180 days, and only Congress can extend them for another 180 days unless the U.S. declares war. Most likely, and as displayed in this Wargame, the President will not mobilize Enhanced Readiness Brigades until needed. This means that the Army must rely on a rapid post-mobilization training period to solve the crisis. If the U.S. waits until this happens or a second Major Regional Conflict (MRC) begins, the conditions could require the U.S. to respond with units less than fully prepared. Since it will take months to make the Enhanced Readiness Brigades combat ready, this will exacerbate the current training deficiencies listed above.

Training Base:

The second issue arises because the U.S. does not currently have the training base to support more than four brigades simultaneously. To continue with subsequent brigades, the CTCs and equivalents have to shut down operations for thirty to sixty days to prepare for the next rotation. This means that the post-mobilization phase is a miracle drug intended to cure all of the peacetime impediments in the National Guard.

Post-mobilization will be a phase where small unit and staff training will simultaneously "spin-up" the separate elements of a brigade to wartime standards. This phase will then culminate with battalion and brigade collective training. These brigades may not have conducted this type of training in peacetime; yet, this phase will certify them for combat. In a crisis where time is essential to achieve national objectives, this environment contains too many severe limitations that will impede the process every step of the way. With all this effort, producing only eight

Enhanced Readiness Brigades in 210 to 240 days is insufficient leverage in a force projection army.

Over-Reliance on Post-Mobilization:

A major drawback of Bold Shift is that post-mobilization requirements are increasing due to the lower level peacetime training focus, and insufficient leader training. The peacetime training focus produces leaders who do not know how to organize, supervise, or conduct training. AirLand Battle doctrine requires a significant amount of technical and tactical expertise. The skills required at the Field grade level to train, maneuver and synchronize actions of combat, combat support, and combat service support are complex. They take years to master. We are asking too much of National Guard Officers given the time they have to train. In his testimony to Congress in 1991, General Burba, then the FORSCOM Commander, said that these complex synchronization skills at company and higher are too difficult to train during weekend drills. This is because to practice these combat skills require that units integrate a whole host of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. General Burba concluded that it takes an incredible amount of time and effort to master these skills.⁷⁹

The Bold Shift program plans for parallel troop and leader training in the Post Mobilization period. It assumes that the small units will achieve the baseline level of competence in individual, platoon and staff skills through Lanes training. Leaders and their staffs, however, will be conducting command and control training parallel with this collective training. Then, complementary training during the post-mobilization period can concentrate on higher-echelons. Bold Shift emphasizes training on the broader, more difficult and more complex tasks after mobilization when there is some assurance of time, mission, and theater of war. Currently, the Enhanced Readiness Brigades have no specific mission or geographic area on which to focus. Consequently, post-mobilization training becomes the only time that brigades can orient training to actual combat or OOTW environments and scenarios.

Some very simple solutions can resolve every one of these problems. Additionally, the legislation and foundation for these solutions already exist. After only minor adjustments, these pieces can provide a Total Force that is truly ready to fight and win our nation's wars.

Solving the Puzzle:

The first action is to assign to the Enhanced Readiness Brigade headquarters the active personnel detailed to the RTD. Also, assign to the subordinate battalion headquarters four active soldiers from the RTD. In other words, the active soldiers will provide all "key" personnel in all Enhanced Readiness Brigade headquarters, and supplement all of the subordinate battalions. The brigade headquarters can be stationed at the post-mobilization training site to simplify the mobilization process. This action alone will remove several hindrances to National Guard readiness. Brigade staffs can conduct the previously listed post-mobilization requirements in peacetime, allowing for Brigade and Battalion collective training to occur earlier in the post-mobilization training cycle. Additionally, they can train, mentor, lead and supervise company commanders while simultaneously training battalion staffs during IDTs, Annual Training, and mobilization. This could realistically diminish post-mobilization training by thirty days.

The four active soldiers assigned to a battalion can work in full-time positions to plan and coordinate unit training. They can serve in positions such as the battalion adjutant, who can serve as the commander's alter ego and advisor; the battalion supply sergeant, trained to obtain supplies and repair parts through the Active Component Supply System; and the training officer and noncommissioned officer who can help organize, conduct and supervise lanes training and post mobilization training. Furthermore, the training officers will have sufficient experience with training methods and unit weaknesses to be able to organize for comprehensive training once in the theater of war.

The Dick Act authorizes the detailing of active soldiers to the

National Guard. Additionally, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General John B. Conway said that the National Guard can accept consolidating active duty personnel into their organizations.⁸⁰ He specifically said that maintaining officer strength in the National Guard has been difficult. Therefore, he recommended as a possible solution, integrating Active duty officers into brigade units. A Brigade headquarters has approximately 100 personnel assigned to it, and can have up to six subordinate combat, combat support or combat service support battalions. Currently, Title XI has directed a total of 12,000 Active soldiers and officers to the RTDs to work with the fifteen Enhanced Readiness Brigades.

The second action is to reduce the number of Enhanced Readiness Brigades from fifteen to eight. This is logical considering the constraints on the training base. The current number of personnel in the RTDs could man eight Enhanced Readiness Brigades and supplement all of their subordinate battalions. Reducing the strain on the training base is important considering the mobilization training required for active and National Guard divisions following that of the Enhanced Readiness Brigades. The decreased mobilization time will discourage individual or small unit call-ups and reduce the pressure for the President to call-up Enhanced Readiness Brigades in preparation for the second MRC.

There are two arguments against integrating these soldiers into the Enhanced Readiness Brigades. They concern the elimination of officer and senior NCO positions from state control, and a perceived reduction in the ability to execute state missions. True, assigning active soldiers to National Guard units takes these positions from state control and reduces opportunities of advancement for some personnel. Nevertheless, only the better trained state officers and noncommissioned officers who can lead and train soldiers in national or state emergencies will advance. In essence, the integration of Active soldiers into the National Guard and the elimination of these positions will support the stated goals of ROPMA. Only the "best qualified" soldiers will be promoted and selected for

commands in the National Guard.

In response to the second issue, the State Headquarters can command and control the battalions in a state emergency. To facilitate this, minor restructuring of the state headquarters might be necessary. However, under the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act, the Enhanced Readiness Brigade staff and commander may execute civil law with specific presidential or congressional approval and direction in a crisis. The relationship between the Brigade headquarters and the State Adjutant General will be no different from what currently exists with the RTD's. Additionally, due to long term associations that will form, Active and Reserve Component soldiers can together strengthen the relationship between the Army and the public.

Combining Active and Reserve Component Strengths:

Army leaders should take the suggestion of the National Guard Bureau and heed General Sullivan's advice to break with the past. They should assign RTD soldiers and officers to the Enhanced Readiness Brigades to improve training, reduce expenditures, and provide the state with better trained leaders. Besides, by combining Active and Reserve Component responsibilities, the Army reduces overhead and eliminates redundancy. Enhanced Readiness Brigade leaders should be capable of training and leading subordinate units and leaders, and should not rely on RTD soldiers to do this. In this fiscally constrained era, elimination of roles and missions is imminent. If the Total Army leaders can find a way to maintain the Army's lethality and its combat efficiency while simultaneously reducing the cost of doing business, the necessary public support will grow even stronger.

The accelerated tempo of the modern battlefield and the current emphasis on combined arms warfare has increased the level of difficulty of command and control at the Battalion and higher echelons. The use of automated support for operations and the use of automated tactical decision aids is rapidly becoming mandatory. Also, the efficiency and effectiveness

of modern weapons used and encountered at the Brigade and lower levels are so powerful that any mistake, indecisiveness or failure by a unit commander or key staff officer will invite total force destruction.⁸¹ It is, therefore, unreasonable to expect an Army National Guard Battalion or Brigade Commander and his staff to achieve combat readiness with the little practice they receive. It is time to realize that the availability of current simulations is not sufficient for providing these officers with the extended practice required for mastering these skills.

Assigning full-time, active soldiers to the Enhanced Readiness Brigades will reduce the intensive training currently required in the post-mobilization phase. Brigade staffs can train during peacetime to become experts at synchronizing complex battlefield systems such as Army Aviation, Air Defense Artillery, direct and indirect fire support, command and control, engineering, and logistics.⁸² By eliminating the constraints of peacetime and post-mobilization training, the Enhanced Readiness Brigades will have the time to learn to synchronize complex, lethal battlefield operation systems.

On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or as poorly as their leaders have trained them. By combining the strengths of the National Guard and the active Army, the Enhanced Readiness Brigade's will be well-trained and well-prepared to fulfill any mission for the Total Army. To do this, however, leaders in both components must continue to work together and not become parochial. National Guard companies and battalions trained to standard and led by Active Army officers and noncommissioned officers experienced in synchronizing combat power is what our Total Army needs in the future. This dynamic, versatile brigade structure will provide the compensating leverage the U.S. has been looking for to enhance its position in the new world order.

VII. CONCLUSION

There are two reasons the United States should rely on enhanced National Guard units. The first is because the long service together in

the National Guard makes members of a unit know and trust each other. There is a profound difference between a collection of individual soldiers and a unit. As modern warfare disperses soldiers across the battlefield, the element of trust has become more important. Soldiers can learn technical skills in weeks or months, but unit cohesion takes years. The second reason pertains to the strategic dimension of the guard. In our democracy, the absence of popular support dooms any "great endeavor." When the U.S. mobilizes a Guard unit, it mobilizes an entire community. The community supports its soldiers. You simply cannot get this kind of public support when you draft isolated individuals, as the U.S. learned the hard way in Vietnam.⁸³

Reserve forces are essential in the Total Force Policy; a Policy that mandates that National Guardsmen have a role to play in future emergencies. Neither Congress nor the American public will accept any part of a new strategy that reduces the Reserve Component role in contingency operations. As the Army continues to reduce its size and looks for ways to save the taxpayers' dollars, its planners must do two things. First, they must take care to preserve the Reserve Component's ability to fulfill their essential role in the Total Force Policy and their other statutory obligations to the state governments. Second, they must remember the history of unprepared units committed to battle. This reduced organization must be able to win the nation's future wars. To do so, the Army must simultaneously take advantage of the Active Component training time and Officer Development Programs with the National Guard's linkage between the Army and American people. If organized like this, the Enhanced Readiness Brigades can train properly and can prepare to work independently in either a state or federal capacity. Developing the Enhanced combat units at Brigade size is appropriate for either role.

Brigade is the Right Size:

Brigade size forces are conducive to conducting state missions. States prefer the Brigades because of their small unit capabilities and

because of their command and control apparatus. The Brigade can be dispersed to conduct small unit actions as typically required in emergency and disaster response and in drug eradication and interdiction. Small unit operations are the strength of the Enhanced Readiness Brigades, resulting from the increased cohesiveness of small town units, and now Bold Shift Lanes training. These Brigade operations normally require decentralized execution with battalions and companies executing independent actions in support of the Brigade mission. Additionally, these Brigades contribute to the moral and social fabric of their state. Soldiers provide role models and ethical standards and examples that young men and women can follow.⁸⁴ This impression does not come from any where else in society. Once federalized, the Brigade's independence and flexibility produce a tailored wartime organization that can be employed within any division structure.

The Brigades' role in wartime is to fight close combat throughout the area of operations. A Brigade must be able to fight in depth and over an extended time. Combat missions for the Enhanced Readiness Brigades can include Tactical Combat Force for a Division or Corps, holding key terrain after the main effort advances, Prisoner of War collection, and Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). The Brigade headquarters' mission is to plan, direct, control and support the execution of close combat by their battalions and companies. In this situation, the Brigade commander is the integrator of the combined arms functions and the brigade battlefield operating systems. The commander and the headquarters must be well versed in these responsibilities because they will be expected to provide flexible and responsive military action in support of National Military Objectives. Thus, these Brigades must expect and prepare for employment anywhere, anytime.

The Brigade Commander exercises direct and indirect influence to establish necessary conditions for sustained organizational success.⁸⁵ He is primarily responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of leader development within his organization. His most important and least understood responsibility is the effect of his leadership skills on his

unit's combat power. His leadership, combined with his direction of firepower, manpower, and protection becomes combat power. He must be technically proficient and understand the capabilities and limitations of the personnel and equipment assigned to his unit. It is not the commander who brings the most capabilities to the battlefield who wins battles, but the commander who makes the most effective use of what he has.⁸⁶ Given the same parameters, good commanders can generate more combat power than mediocre ones.

Restructuring:

The performance of the Brigade Command Group permeates itself throughout the Brigade and improves or degrades subordinate unit performances.⁸⁷ As currently structured, time limitations for training Enhanced Readiness Brigade staffs will prevent them from mastering and retaining staff coordination and combined arms employment expertise that is necessary to survive on the modern battlefield. Tactical analysis requires the Brigade Commander and his staff and leaders to "read" the battlefield. They must know some key things about the enemy, about the effects of terrain and about the full range of their own unit capabilities.

During the heat of battle, the commander must control maneuver units, indirect fire units, resupply efforts and evacuation while trying to sense possible changes in the enemy situation and other environmental factors. Simulations cannot replace the physical, mental and environmental stress of field training. They cannot be a primary method of teaching and training, especially for the leadership and soldiers of ground combat units.⁸⁸ It takes a well-trained staff to command and control all elements of a combat Brigade. Reorganizing the Enhanced Readiness Brigade and Battalion staffs into a truly Total Army mix will afford sufficient training time to exercise and practice staffs on the wartime tasks before mobilization.

Recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Iraq, and Rwanda all occurring nearly simultaneously, while the volatile Korean situation stews, should send a clear warning to national and military leaders. The

potential for simultaneous U.S. involvement in multiple regional contingencies exists. The U.S. could find itself in a position where an aggressor in one region attempts to take advantage of the U.S. when the U.S. heavily commits forces elsewhere. In order to confront this possibility properly, the Army must structure the Enhanced Readiness Brigades to provide true compensating leverage to the Total Army. History repeatedly shows what happens when nations force inadequately trained men and women and units to learn combat skills on the battlefield. Those who survive become excellent soldiers in effective units but they purchase their skills at the cost of much blood.

Training:

The history of America's first battles also reveals the failure of the U.S. Army to train its staffs properly in peacetime.⁸⁹ To meet today's challenges, American ground forces must deploy rapidly from stateside bases and must prepare to fight immediately upon entering the theater of war. Only well trained, tactically proficient commanders and staffs will enable the U.S. Army to break with these historical trends. The U.S. has to improve its National Guard training, especially in leadership and command and control of Enhanced Readiness Brigade personnel, and fully integrate pre-mobilization training with post-mobilization training. The past unpreparedness has cost young American lives and risks defeat, and thus is unacceptable in the future.

Learning the right lessons is critical for this Nation for one reason: The rapid decline in the size of the Active Forces means that the Enhanced Readiness Brigades must be mobilized immediately in some crises and must be ready for combat as soon as thirty to sixty days later. If America gives its sons and daughters the right training, equipment, effective leadership, and adequate time then they will have the motivation and ability to be great soldiers. They will be able to fight and win against any enemy, anywhere, any time. Bold Shift is providing the appropriate small unit training and equipment to the Enhanced Readiness

Brigades. Integrating Active Component soldiers into this structure can provide the effective leadership and adequate time necessary for success on the future battlefield.

Truly Enhanced Readiness Brigades:

Presently, the Total Army is not one, but three separate components vying for dollars and prestige. This situation is not much different from the way it was just before the Spanish-American War and the passage of the Dick Act. To preclude the inefficiencies of the early 1900s, Total Army leaders must break with history and truly embrace General Abrams' vision of a Total Force. Because of the reduced threat to the nation and limited dollars available to the Department of Defense, the Enhanced Readiness Brigades are a primary force in the future Total Army structure. As currently structured, they will not enable the Army to achieve future objectives. So as to not set these Brigades up for failure like the Roundout Brigades, and so as to be able to achieve the objectives set before them, changes have to be made to their structure and training. Providing a professional Brigade headquarters structure, together with well trained, highly motivated companies and battalions is paramount to future success. The nation will judge the Army by a single standard - did the Army protect and defend the Constitution and Nation? Therefore, the Enhanced Readiness Brigades have to become a single army force, oriented on executing state and federal missions. To achieve the capabilities and strengths of the Enhanced Readiness Brigades, the separate components must become integrated pieces melded into a cohesive whole and must synergistically maximize their capabilities.

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